UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-27-2014

Kugler v. Nelson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41039

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Kugler v. Nelson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41039" (2014). Not Reported. 1439.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1439

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOHN B. KUGLER,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

)
)
)
)

RON NELSON, DAVID J. POWERS )
And WILLIAM J. ARMSTRONG,

Supreme Court No.
41039-2013

)
)

_____________

Defendants-Respondents.)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
An Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls
The Honorable G. Richard Bevan, presiding.

John B. Kugler
2913 Galleon Ct. NE
Tacoma, WA 98422
Attorney, prose, for Appellant

Brooke Baldwin Redmond

P.O. Box 226
Twin Falls, ID 83303
Attorney for Respondents

ED-COPY
FEB 2 7 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOHN 8. KUGLER,

)
)
Plaintiff-Appellant
)
vs.
)
)
RON NELSON, DAVID J. POWERS and
)
WILLIAM J. ARMSTRONG,
)
)
Defendants-Respondents.)
)

Supreme Court No.
41039-2013

______________

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
An Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls
The Honorable G. Richard Bevan, presiding.

John B. Kugler
2913 Galleon Ct. NE
Tacoma, WA 98422
Attorney, prose, for Appellant

Brooke Baldwin Redmond

P.O. Box 226
Twin Falls, ID 83303
Attorney for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES - - - - - - - - - - -

p. 1

STATEMENTOFTHECASE---------------------------

p. 4

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - p. 5
ARGUMENT - -

- - - - - - - - -

CONCLUSION - - - - - -

- - -

- - - -

8

- - - - - - - -

p. 13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

p. 14

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Bell v. Idaho Tran. Dept., 159 Idaho 659,262 P. 3d 1030
Brower v. E. I. DuPont A Demours Co.,117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345
Buku Properties LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828,291 P.3d 1031
Bushi v. Sage Healthcare, PLLC, 146 Idaho 264,203 P.3d 694
Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741,274 P. 3d 1256
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,208 P.3d 289
First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,824 P. 2d 844
Henderson v Henderson Invest. Prop, LLC, 148 Idaho 638, 225 P.3d 568
Manos v. Moss, 143 Idaho, 927, 155 P. 3d 1166
Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129,326 P. 2d 994
McCann v. Mccann, 152 Idaho 809,275 P.3d 824
Necro Minerals Co. v. Morris Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 90 P. 3d 894
Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108
Shaver v. Huckleberry Estates LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685
Taylor v. AIA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829
Thompson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99,205 P. 3d 1235

Washington Federal Savings v. Van Engelen. 153 Idaho 648, 289 P.3d 50
Wesco Auto Body Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 243 P. 3d 1069
Western Family v. Vanek, 144 Idaho 150, 90
I.R.C.P. Rules 15(a) and 15(d)
2005 Idaho Code, Chapter 30-1-6
Idaho Code, Chapter 30-1-627(4)

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The appellate court freely reviews issues involving statutes of limitation.
Necro Minerals Co. v. Morris Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 90 P. 3d 894
Western Family v. Vanek, 144 Idaho 150, 158 P. 3d 313

II
Fraudulent concealment of a cause of action generally tolls the statute of
limitations until the cause of action is discovered or might have been discovered by
the exercise of diligence.
CJS V. 54, section 118

III
Great liberality should be exercised in permitting amendments to pleadings
in furtherance of justice between the parties and in construing pleadings as the
focus is on insuring that a just result is accomplished.
Villa Highlands LLC v. Western Com. Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 598,226 P.3d 540
IV
An application to amend a pleading is directed to the sound discretion of the
court but if exercise of such discretion deprives a party to the action of some
substantial right, it is error.
Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129,326 P.2d 994
V
A party cannot tortuously interfere with his own contract.

Ostrander v. Farm Bureau, 123 Idaho 650,851 P.2d
VI
2

A party may challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial court's

findings without having presented that contention to the trial court.
Thompson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 205 P. 3d 1235

VII
Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation
and legal effect are questions of law.
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P. 3d 685
VIII

A contract, when being reviewed as to its meaning and effect, as well as
applicable statutes, should be reviewed as to the whole instrument to discern the
parties' intentions, rights and obligations.
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Prop. LLC, 148 Idaho 638,225 P. 3rd 568
IX
Whether a district court has correctly determined that a case is based on a
commercial transaction for the purposes of an award of attorney fees is a question
oflaw over which the Supreme Court exercises free review.
Buku Properties LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828,291 P. 3d 1037
X

Where a valid contract between the parties exists and contains a provision
on attorney fees the provisions of the contract control.
Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, 122 Idaho 565, 836 P.2d 511
XI
Fraud may be established by silence where there is a duty to speak and in a
closely held corporation the corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to one
another, to the corporation and to the shareholders.
Moss v. Manos, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166
Washington Federal Savings v. Van Engelen, 153 Idaho 648,289 P.3d 50

3

XII
The role of the appellate court is to review a trial court's evidentiary rulings
under the abuse of discretion standard.
Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108
XIV
A manifest abuse of discretion is one exercised imprudently or thoughtlessly
and without due consideration.
Jones Rigging and Heavy Hauling, Inc. v. Parker (Ark) 66 SW 3d 599

xv
The trial court should consider new evidence when presented on a motion
for reconsideration.
Barmore v. Perron, 145 Idaho, 340, 179 P.3d 303
XVI
Did the trial court err in its determination that one must allege and prove
fraudulent conduct to establish a delay in the accrual of a statute of limitations?

XVII
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract and is
breached by any action by any party which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs
any benefit of the agreement.
Sushi v. Sage Health Care PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694
First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 844
Westco Auto Body Supply, Inc. v. Ernst, 149 Idaho 881, 243 P.3d 1069
XVIII
The primary purpose of a stock redemption statute is to protect minority
stockholders and creditors from corporate mismanagement by preventing boards of
directors from draining corporate assets and majority shareholders have a
heightened fiduciary duty to minority stockholders precluding them from using
their control to their own advantage.
Taylor v. A.I.A. Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P. 3d 829
McCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809,275 P.3d 824,
4

XIX
A court is not required to award reasonable attorney fees under Section 12-

201(3) as the gravamen of the offense at issue should be considered.
Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,987 P.2d 1035
Brower v. E. I. DuOontA. Demours Co. 117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the trial Court err in determining that plaintiff had failed to prove any
claim against any of the defendants?
Did Judge Stoker err or abuse his discretion by placing the matter on the trial
calendar prior to the time that it was fully at issue?
Did Judge Brody err or abuse his discretion when he denied appellant's
Motion For Leave To Amend that had been filed within the first two months of these
adverse proceedings?
Did Judge Bevin err or abuse his discretion in declining to reconsider Judge
Brody's decisions denying leave to amend and denying leave to add additional
parties?
Did Judge Bevan err in any of his findings of fact and conclusions of law
justifying the setting aside of his decision and judgment herein?
Is the obligation of the defendants to abide by the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing a continuing obligation such that each breach is an independent offense?
Does a void or prohibited transaction commence the accrual of any statute of
limitations?
Is a redemption of stock by a closely held corporation a closely held
corporation a "commercial transaction"?
Did the Court properly award attorney fees without considering a set-off,
claimed fees for non appearing attorneys or for fees on a losing appeal.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This proceeding is now on review by this Court for a second time.
Accordingly, this Court is somewhat familiar with the proceedings before it. In the
first appeal were several issues that were not addressed at that time and they now
appear in this proceeding. In the prior appeal this Court had before it the fact that
your plaintiff-appellant had pending a motion to amend the complaint filed on
December 20, 2010. An appearance, answer and a summary judgment motion on
behalf of the defendant Ron Nelson were filed on November 17, 2010. Each parties'
motions had been noticed for hearing on January 31, 2011 pursuant to Judge
Stoker's order of Jan 3, 2011. Although some discussion by the Judge occurred at
the hearing, no order was entered in regard to plaintiffs motion for leave to amend
and the summary judgment issue was postponed to a later date uncertain. A
hearing for Mr. Nelson's Summary Judgment was set for March 28 and Mr. Gladd set
a hearing on his request to withdraw as counsel for your plaintiff on the same date.
On the same day Judge Stoker permitted the withdrawal by Mr. Gladd and on the
29 th a copy of the order was posted to affiant. On April 12 th Judge Stoker entered a
summary judgment decision in favor of Mr. Nelson without giving appellant an
opportunity to argue against the summary judgment request. Your plaintiff timely
appeared, prose, and filed a motion asking the Court to set aside the Summary
Judgment. Plaintiff also filed a motion seeking leave to supplement opposition to the
summary judgment request. In the notice of hearing on those motions plaintiff also
included notice of hearing plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend that had not been
previously ruled on. Judge Stoker refused to permit appellant to argue the motion
for leave to amend and denied the request to supplement opposition grounds or to
set aside the Summary Judgment. The issue of wrongful denial of leave to amend
reappears in this second appeal.
Shortly after the hearing before Judge Stoker, counsel for Mr. Nelson made
demand for payment of the award for fees and costs, threatening execution, on the
award granted by Judge Stoker. The claim was promptly paid by your appellant. On
receipt of this Court's opinion in the first appeal your appellant promptly sent to Mr.
6

Nelson's counsel a request for the return of those monies together with computed
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date that the monies were received
by Wright Brothers Law Office. Request was also made for the payment of costs
awarded by the Court of appeals with judgmental interest from the date of this
Court's award. Appellant wanted these funds so as to be able to hire an attorney.
Those requests were ignored and subsequently, in this proceeding, your appellant
raised this issue before Judge Bevan. Finally on one attempt, in open Court, counsel
for Mr. Nelson represented that Mr. Nelson would pay the money within a week.
That did not occur. At the next hearing in open Court, March 18th, counsel for Mr.
Nelson represented that the funds had been delivered to the clerks office that day.
The Court then entered its Order to Disperse Funds which did not arrive until just
days before the trial.
This Court's Remittitur was received by the trial court in Twin Falls on July
20, 2012 and by your appellant on July 23 rd . On the same date that the Remittitur
was filed in the District Court Judge Stoker placed the matter on the trial schedule
and sent out a order directing counsel of record to attend a scheduling hearing in
Twin Falls. The Pre-trial Order requiring a personal appearance of counsel before
the Court. Appellant, after receipt of the Remittitur, filed a notice of disqualification
of Judge Stoker and thereafter a motion for disqualification on the basis of prejudice.
The case was not at issue as to the defendants Powers and Armstrong at the time
Judge Stoker placed the matter on the trial calendar although it was at issue as to
the defendant Nelson. On August 20 th Tom Holmes caused a stipulation for
substitution of counsel to be filed and on the next day Brooke Redmond filed an
appearance on behalf of the defendants Powers and Armstrong. This proceeding did
not get at issue as to the defendants Powers and Armstrong until January 30, 2013
at which time a responsive pleading was filed on behalf of these two defendants.
Prior to Judge Stoker's withdrawal plaintiff was advised by Mrs. Redmond
that appearance in Twin Falls would not be required if we could stipulate to a
response to each and every question in Judge Stoker's Pre-trial Order and that was
the only way possible to avoid a very expensive trip to Twin Falls. On September
14th Judge Stoker entered an Order accepting counsels' stipulation and vacated the
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scheduling conference. On September 17th Judge Stoker withdrew and Judge Bevan
appointed himself as the successor. On September 19 th Judge Bevan set a trial date.
On December 10, 2012 plaintiff filed a Motion For Leave To Add Additional
Parties. On December 11 th a hearing was scheduled for January 7, 2013 concerning
plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend filed on December 20, 2010 and on Plaintiffs
Motion for Leave to Add Additional Parties. On December 12 th defendants filed a
Motion For Summary Judgment. Judge Bevan then reset the hearing on these
motions for January 17th . Appellant travelled to Twin Falls and found that Judge
Brody was conducting the hearing. Judge Brody denied plaintiffs motion for leave to
amend and plaintiffs motion to add additional parties. Plaintiff also filed motions to
vacate the trial date and/ or to reschedule a date giving plaintiff time to properly
prepare, hopefully with an attorney. These motions and request for reconsideration
of the denial of leave to amend were denied by the Court. Plaintiff had filed motions
to vacate the trial setting or to postpone trial for the reason that appellant was not
able to properly prepare the trial, that appellant was being rushed by counsel for
the defendants and that no attorney was willing to consider assisting appellant on
such short notice even if appellant had secured the large sum required as a retainer.
Appellant was required to make a second expensive trip for a personal appearance
before the Court lasting five minutes of the Court's time. The Court advised the
parties to be in court for trial on April 2nd • That was it.

ARGUMENT

Appellant is addressing the issues in this proceeding, in part, in a reverse
manner by starting at the end. The trial Court, after dismissing plaintiffs complaint
entered a judgment against plaintiff for a very large sum of money which included
claims by counsel for attorney fees related to her preparation for a summary
judgment, which when granted she lost on appeal. It also had a smaller claim for a
second summary judgment, hastily filed as we approached a trial date and which
was denied by the trial Court. In making it's decision to award fees the trial Court
correctly determined that attorney fees could not be awarded pursuant to the terms
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of the stockholder's agreement as claimed by Mrs. Redmond. Judge Bevan did,
however, accept counsel's claim for fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3).
Appellant does not agree as it is apparent that the Court did not look to the
gravamen of the offense. This was not an arms-length business transaction. This was
a personal matter for the benefit of Mr. Nelson who had given notice of resignation
and wanted to do no more for the company. It was also a personal matter with Mr.
Powers who wanted nothing further to do with Mr. Nelson. This was nothing more
than an accounting and a redivision of assets and as such was far more a person
matter than a business transaction.
The Court in it decision to make Most of these charges appear in the claims of
the defendants individually. Ron Nelson's claim includes charges of an attorney who
has never appeared in this proceeding and has shown nothing to support a need for
advice or assistance other than that provided by Mrs. Redmond. Mr. Holmes has
filed a claim for fees incurred herein for which he did nothing more than file a notice
of appearance and a notice of withdrawal. Appellant believes that some of the fees
relate to work requested on behalf of Mr. Powers and issues related to H & M which
may even have been incurred prior to the filing of the complaint in this proceeding
or related to his activities in formulating an agreement un related to the issue of the
Prater stock. Mr. Powers makes a claim for attorney fee that he did not pay but
which in fact were paid by H & M in which plaintiff remains a stockholder. The
failure of the Court to not give these claims a closer look has deprived appellant of a
constitutional right to be heard and might result in unjust enrichment to each
defendant as counsel has already caused the issuance of a Writ of Execution for the
judgment amount without considering appellants offset for a cost bill against Mr.
Nelson as well as accrued interest on monies previously taken. The award of
attorney fees should be reversed for recomputation by the trial court in the event
that the judgment of dismissal is sustained including any set-off of which the Court
was previously made aware.
Judge Given, in his findings of fact, nos. 3 and 4, indicted that he was
addressing the issue of fraudulent concealment. He noted that the parties in this
proceeding were each stockholders in H & Mand that Mr. Nelson had an
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employment agreement with the company. He found there was not a ninety day
waiting time from the meeting in February to the meeting in May but gave no effect
to that point. He continued, acknowledging that plaintiff had no knowledge of these
meetings, but then concluded that there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment
precluding, in effect, the commencement of a five year statute of limitation. The
Court's finding No. 17 is totally inconsistent with Idaho law. Idaho law has always
been that every contract in Idaho has an implied covenant of a requirement of good
faith and fair dealing. It is not fair to omit a notice required by operating rules
requiring notice. Silence is not golden. Directors have an obligation to speak with
each other particularly in a closely held corporation as was H & M. It was not
necessary for appellant to label the lack of notice as fraudulent. The act or lack of an
act in and of itself establishes the fraud involved. The acts of the defendants were
indeed concealed from the plaintiff and the statute could not begin to run until a
reasonable time to find the details of the wrongdoing had passed. The finding of fact
nos. 17 and 19 are not supported by the evidence and the dismissal of the complaint
was an error of law requiring reversal.
In finding of fact no. 18 the Court accurately determined that plaintiff had a
small increase in his percentage interest in the company as the company retained
some of the Prater stock Judge Bevan, for some reason, however neglected to
consider the provision of the shareholders agreement that gives each individual
stockholder a right to a pro rata share in accord with the existing ratios. He
overlooked the changes resulting from the undisclosed acts of the other directors
and Mr. Nelson. As was reflected in the 2004 record Mr. Armstrong and plaintiff had
equal pro rata shares. His action of acquiring 6 additional shares established that
his percentage increase would violate the pro rata clause of the agreement and
would be a little more than an additional 13.3% greater increase than appellant's
increase. In Mr. Nelson's situation owning only 27 shares his increase would be
very close to 75%. The only way to for a pro rata ratio to remain in effect was to
have issued no shares of the Prater stock The finding that appellant incurred no
damages by the issuance of the stock cannot be sustained. The breach of the pro
rata provision was a breach of the implied covenant of fair dealing and did cause
10

plaintiff to suffer harm. Anytime there is an increase of stock shares to one owner
from another, particularly a minority stock holder, a loss occurs. Such a loss is
indeed damaging and was certainly more than one dollar. Judge Bevan's finding of
fact no. 19 is also not supported by the evidence and his finding no. 20 ignores the
covenant of fair dealing and should also be set aside.
The trial Court entered a finding, (No. 10), that it was" determined "that a
Prater sale would be made and that H & M would be the purchaser. The same
finding indicated that it was also " determined " that the company would transition
from a two party management to single management with the defendant Nelson
having all management rights and obligations. The Court correctly found that your
appellant had no knowledge of this transaction. The Court erred, however, in
asserting, and then relying on, it's finding that the instrument effected a
"determination". No notice of proposed sale was ever mailed to appellant as
required by the corporate by-laws. As such the meeting and action supposedly
taken was a nullity for non-compliance with operating procedural rules.
Additionally it was also void for the reason that the instrument did not bear the
signatures of the directors alleged to have waived notice. A waiver requires the
signature of the director to be effective as demonstrated on defendants Exhibit D
and plaintiffs exhibit no. 4. More significantly this purported meeting of the
subchapter S corporation stockholders was void (emphasis supplied) for the reason
that it failed to comply with Idaho's corporate code as an agreement for corporate
redemption. It did not contain therein a provision that any redemption of stock
required a caveat provision that any redemption must be paid out of capital surplus.
Appellant would remind the Court that the stockholders agreement precluded
redemption, in accord with the Idaho corporate code, as was plainly intended at the
time the agreement was written and the corporation was created.
Judge Bevan identified the meeting of April 2 as the "trigger" for the
commencement of the five year statute of limitations which time had passed a few
days before the complaint was filed. That too is error as again the document or,
notice, if any, was not mailed to your appellant and has not been properly executed.
Without an agreement for redemption there can be no sale or purchase of stock by
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virtue of the stockholders restricted sale agreement. An agreement cannot be based
upon a void agreement. At the most it might be figuratively considered as the
"loading of the gun" but then only with blank shells. The factual "trigger and
discharge" occurred at a date uncertain, after September 30 th, when the defendant
Armstrong did the accounting for the end of the fiscal year and allocated profits in
accord with a newly adjusted share rather than the pro rata share resulting from the
purported issuance of additional shares to the defendants. This date was well within
a five year statute of limitation and could not be related back to any date prior to
September 30, 2009, a date subsequent to the filing of the complaint. Judge Bevan
found that appellant had not been notified or informed by the respondents in
regards to the Prater stock but had received information, the annual report, late in
the year which should have put affiant on reasonable notice that something had
occurred. It should be noted that the clever language utilized by the defendant
Armstrong in that report did not set forth who bought stock or how much stock was
sold. It should also be note that this was not an "arms length" transaction and that
each of the alleged purchasers did not make a single dime payment. The annual
payment made at the end of the year did not finance the payments made monthly to
Prater.
The defendant-respondent was a general manager of the corporation and he
never disclosed his purported purchase of 20 shares of the stock from H &M. He had
disclosed that he had purchased some Prater stock when he attempted to purchase
my stock even on the day prior to the scheduled stockholder meeting in early March
2009. He also failed to personally comply with the 60 day notice requirement of a
proposed sale of his stock to Dave Powers and "the company." Appellant attempted
to amend the complaint in this regard as it was newly discovered material evidence
that created greater injury to appellant than did the undiscovered sale involving the
Prater stock. He also had a fiduciary duty to disclose that he had become the sole
general manager of H & M as he was well aware that appellant was a director of the
corporation and that it was reasonable to keep directors involved on such matters.
This he did not do. Mr. Nelson had an employment agreement with the board of
directors of H & M to whom he was required to be responsible. A breach of contract
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consists of a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise that forms the
whole or part of a contract. Plaintiffs proposed amendment to the action against
him sets forth many promises that were not kept. Mr. Nelson had obligations and
duties both as a stock holder and as an employee of H & M. Evidence existed that
appellant tried to bring into these proceedings by amendment that established a
failure to perform duties in the contract. He certainly knew that he was violating his
stockholder agreement when he entered into an agreement for a sale of stock
without giving notice just as he knew that he was not meeting his responsibilities of
his employment agreement which he did not reveal to any of the directors. As
appellant asserted in his affidavits new evidence of facts had been discovered after
the filing of the complaint in that regard. Mr. Nelson proposed his stock sale and
had not personally fulfilled his notice obligation under the stockholders agreement.
Additionally some needed information upon which to establish an amount of
damage was still being awaited. The refusal of the trial court to allow an amendment
of the complaint against Nelson on the same grounds as existed with respect to the
Prater stock was both error and a manifest abuse of discretion. The denial of an
amendment, based on new evidence of wrongdoing that effected the financial status
of H & M was also a manifest abuse of discretion and operated as an unjust
enrichment to Mr. Nelson and an indirect damage to plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

Appellant contends that justice has not prevailed in this proceeding. The
basic principle that great liberty should be given in the granting of a request for an
amendment of pleadings exists in Idaho. To be able to fully present one's claim is a
basic proposition of constitutional law. The injustice that has resulted from the
dismissal of appellant's claim has in effect resulted in an unjust enrichment in favor
of the defendants. The dismissal judgment entered by the trial Court should be
considered void as the Court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power
constituting a violation of due process. These defendant's each have contributed to
the destruction of a bona fide small business in Twin Falls, Idaho which, but for the
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conduct of the defendant Ron Nelson, might still be a viable business. To appellant
this is very destructive and some balance of loss can only come from the reversal of
the judgment of dismissal entered by the trial court. As a minority stockholder, the
denial of an opportunity to approach the claim for damages on other viable legal
theories precluded presentation of misconduct by these defendants and was both
error and a manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court proceedings.

Respectfully Submitted,

JOHrfB. KUGLER

/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that two copies of Appellant's Brief were served on the
respondents by mailing the same to Brooke Baldwin Redmond, P.O. Box 226, Twin
Falls, ID, 83303 this 24th day of February, 2014.
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